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1 Introduction
In January 2003, the European Commission (henceforth EC) published a new regulation
modifying the procedure for the detection of anti-competitive practices and abuses of
dominant position.1 The main effects of this reform are to replace the current notification
system of ex ante monitoring in favor of an ex post offence repression regime and to
decentralize the enforcement of competition rules by strengthening the Member States’
authorities powers and jurisdiction.
The European competition policy towards inter-firms agreements relies mostly on ar-
ticle 81 of the European Community Treaty. Under article 81(1) “shall be prohibited (...)
any agreement (...) which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market.” Price-fixing or market-sharing agreements (such as resale price maintenance for
instance) belong to this category. However, under article 81(3) some agreements can nev-
ertheless be declared valid if they promote economic progress or enhance the distribution
of goods within the Common Market and consumers get a “fair share of the resulting ben-
efit.” For instance, R&D joint ventures or even some exclusive distribution agreements
might satisfy these conditions.
In 1962, regulation 17 setting the rules for the implementation of article 81 was pub-
lished by the EC and stated that individual exemption (under article 81(3)) could only be
granted if the agreement had been notified to the EC. The EC decided at the time to keep
the exclusive right to grant exemption in order to develop a coherent law enforcement and
to diffuse a competition culture within each of the member states. A broad interpretation
of the concept of “restriction to competition” combined to the fact that regulation 17 im-
posed a response for each notification led to the EC being quickly overwhelmed:2 by 1967
more than 37450 cases were pending. The EC thus took several steps in order to limit
the number of notifications and speed up the process: “general notices” were published,
the concept of “appreciable effect on competition” was introduced to ignore minor cases
and the block exemptions regulations were set up. At the same time, some restrictive
clauses (black list) were deemed anticompetitive and disqualified the agreements from
qualifying under block exemptions system. Finally, the EC extensively started to close
1The new regulation was adopted in the context of the modernization of European competition law
and replaces regulation 17/1962 as from the 1st May 2004. See Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Official
Journal of the European Communities, 4th January 2003.
2See Verouden (2003) who provides a detailed analysis of the evolution of the EC interpretation of
article 81.
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cases informally (“comfort letters”). Nevertheless, problems still remained: less than 20
formal decisions were taken every year in the early 1990’s, although the annual number
of notified cases had been reduced to around 250. Moreover, less than 1% of the noti-
fications led to a prohibition decision, suggesting that some resources could have been
saved. This pushed the EC to reform the system, trying to refocus antitrust intervention
on the most severe anti-competitive practices such as cartels. In order to free the much
needed resources, the EC decided to decentralize the enforcement of competition rules to
the Member States and to remove the costly and ineffective notification system. The new
legal exception regime came into force on 1st May 2004.
This paper provides a framework to compare the efficiency of these different systems:
notifications, legal exception, block exemptions and black list. We claim that the shift
from the notification regime to the legal exception regime is relevant only if the quality of
judgement of the EC is sufficiently high. We show that if the accuracy of the evaluation
achieved during the investigation is high enough, it is possible to deter the signature of
some harmful agreements only, by setting the appropriate fines in the ex post regime.
If the quality of evaluation is low, fines would deter the signature of welfare improving
agreements as well. In this case, early intervention is preferable and a notification system
can thus be more effective than a legal exception regime. In other words, a higher quality
of evaluation by the Competition Authority (henceforth CA) advocates in favor of the ex
post control regime. Forty years of experience have given the EC a better knowledge of
the market organization, of the competition mechanisms and of the impact of agreements
on economic welfare. The EC evaluations are therefore likely to be better now, which
may justify the change towards an ex post control of the agreements. However, this may
not have been the case in 1962 explaining the initial preference for a notification regime.
Besides, the relative costs of type I and type II errors are also important factors in the
choice of regime: we show that when the accuracy of evaluation is low and type II errors
might be very costly, the black list system banning any agreement is preferred, while block
exemptions regulations can be justified whenever type I errors become too costly relative
to type II errors.
In contrast to the literature on regulation, few theoretical papers have focused on
optimal competition policy design and implementation problems.3 The recent debate
3Rey (2003) provides a detailed presentation of competition policy design and implementation issues,
and proposes a broad review of the existing literature. Cartel prosecution has the major area of interest
for economic theory with a wide literature following works by Baron and Besanko (1984), Reinganum
and Wilde (1985b) and Besanko and Spulber (1989). In the recent years, cartel prosecution has again
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about the reform of European competition policy has however triggered some research on
the subject.
First, this reform is going to be welfare improving only if the national courts maintain
the necessary unity in the EC competition rules enforcement. Mavroidis and Neven (2000,
2001) point out that simultaneous enforcement by several authorities is likely to occur
and that each Member State will have little incentives to take into account the interests
of other Member States. They show that decentralization may have a disintegrating effect
and advocate for the emergence a formal coordination procedure.
Second, to be welfare improving, the legal exception regime has to be at least as ef-
ficient as the notification regime. Barros (2003) and Neven (2001) focus on the impact
that the proposed change might have on the type of agreements that firms might imple-
ment and explicitly model the firms’ reactions to the different policies. Barros (2003)
considers identical firms and focuses on the impact of the reduced legal security created
by the removal of the notification regime. He shows that the proposed reform may have
two opposite effects: on the one hand, the probability of audit being reduced in the ex
post regime, firms might be tempted to sign more restrictive agreements. On the other
hand, as legal uncertainty increases, they are likely to take less risk. The latter effect is
however more likely to prevail, implying that the reform should result in firms signing
less restrictive agreements. Neven (2001) considers heterogenous firms and focuses on the
decision to notify potential agreements. He shows that the distribution of agreements
implemented by firms should be more dispersed. Ex post monitoring indeed leads to a
higher transaction cost thereby leading firms to sign agreements that are more likely to be
cleared by the competition authority. Some beneficial agreements are therefore no longer
implemented. Moreover, removing the notification regime induces some anti-competitive
agreements which would have been notified otherwise to be implemented and not moni-
tored. This advocates for a rather high level of ex post audit to limit the impact of these
errors.
Although closely related to these two papers, our work differs in significant ways. In
their papers, firms are uncertain on whether an agreement is harmful or not and the audit
is used to elicit this information. We assume instead that firms are aware of the status
of the agreement and analyze the impact of a given policy on the firms decision to sign
an agreement. Considering a model of imperfect audit, we then compare the ex post and
ex ante regimes, looking as well as per se rules such as black list or block exemptions
been given attention following the implementation of leniency programs in the US and in Europe (See
for instance Motta and Polo (2003) or Spagnolo (2000)).
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regulations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the framework and briefly
describes the different legal systems. We first analyse the legal exception regime in section
3 and then compare it with a mixed regime involving notifications (section 4). Section 5
discusses these results and concludes. Most proofs are relegated in Appendices.
2 The Model
2.1 The Firms and the Competition Authority
There exists a continuum of size 1 of pairs of firms that can enter into agreements or
decisions which may be judged as harmful for social welfare by a Competition Authority.4
Pairs of firms are divided up into two groups:
• A first category of pairs of firms have the opportunity to sign a “bad” agreement
(B) . Such an agreement generates, if implemented, an extra profit for the firms,
πB = 1, and a negative total surplus denoted −WB, where WB > 0 is normalized
to WB = 2.
• A second category of pairs of firms can sign “good” agreements (G) . Such agree-
ments, if implemented, have a positive overall effect on welfareWG = 2ω (with ω > 0) .
Firms then increase their profits by πG = π < 1.
In contrast to Barros (2003) and Neven (2001), we do not want to focus on the effects
of selected policies on the type of agreements chosen by the firms and thus assume that
the firms cannot influence the type of agreements they may sign, but only choose whether
to sign (and implement) them. We believe that this assumption is realistic in our discrete
framework: although the firms might be able to make their agreement more appealing to
the CA, this might be limited to fine-tuning.
The CA does not observe the type of each agreement but knows the sizes of the two
groups, i.e. the proportions of good (ηG) and bad (ηB) agreements. In order to simplify
the presentation, we assume that these proportions are identical
¡
ηG = ηB =
1
2
¢
. The
CA’s decision to prohibit an agreement will depend on these proportions, but also on the
4We consider here agreements falling under article 81(3). Agreements can either be harmful or ben-
eficial, the latter being the most interesting type of agreements: even if they restrict competition, they
may have positive effects that can offset harmful effects and increase social welfare.
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overall impact on welfare. Without any additional information the expected welfare is:
EW = ηGWG − ηBWB = ω − 1.
The variable ω ∈ [0,+∞[ can thus be interpreted as the CA’s prior beliefs which will
in practice depend on the category of agreements we consider. For instance, the CA is
likely to have more optimistic priors when dealing with joint research and development
agreements than with horizontal market sharing or price fixing agreements.
The CA’s objective is to maximize the welfare impact of the agreements, and it there-
fore wants to deter bad agreements while ensuring that good agreements are effectively
signed. The CA has to determine which policy to implement, that is, to choose when and
how to control agreements. It can choose among legal regimes, which will be described in
more details later on:
• Pure ex post control: Agreements are audited after they have been signed and
partially implemented. This system corresponds to legal exception regime recently
adopted by the European Commission.
• Mixed regime with notifications: Agreements can be monitored, either before they
are actually signed by the firms (ex ante control through a notification system) or
as in the pure ex post regime after they have been signed. This regime reflects the
system used before the reform.
A third possibility is to consider that any agreement is legal per se and no monitoring
takes place. This system corresponds exactly to the existing block exemptions regulations
(BE) used by the European Commission to reduce the number of notifications and save
resources. Under this regime, all agreements are signed and fully implemented, and the
expected social welfare is WBE = ω − 1 .
Notice that these policies cover the whole range of policies implemented by the Euro-
pean Commission for agreements between firms falling under article 81.5
3 Legal Exception Regime
Let us first consider the case of pure ex post control or legal exception regime: Under such
regime, any agreement is valid (and can thus be implemented) unless it is audited and
prohibited by the CA. Formally, the game we analyze in this section is the following:
5As we will see later, the block exemptions and black list (i.e. all agreements are per se illegal) regimes
are special cases of ex post control.
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1. Each pair of firms observes the type (T ∈ {B,G}) of the agreement they have the
opportunity to sign, and decides whether to sign it (sT = 1) or not (sT = 0) . These
decisions are not observed by the CA.
2. The CA chooses the probability p with which it will run the investigations. During
the audit theCA receives additional information about the agreement (i.e. it receives
a signal σ ∈ {b, g}) on which it can base its decision to clear (δE (σ) = 1) or to
prohibit the agreement (δE (σ) = 0) . If the CA decides to prohibit the agreement,
it can also impose a financial penalty that may depend on the information received
during the investigation (F (σ) ≥ 0).
Let us now discuss in more details the main assumptions of this model. First, we
assume that the CA cannot pre-commit to the probabilities or to the decisions it will
take, following the modeling strategy adopted by Besanko and Spulber (1993) in the
case of mergers. This assumption has clearly implications on the equilibria.6 However,
this seems consistent with the application of competition law: although the competition
authorities publish guidelines on how agreements will be challenged, these guidelines are
only a general set of rules leaving the authorities with some discretion when taking a
decision.
Any audit takes place after the agreement has been signed and partially implemented.
Therefore, when the CA decides to stop an agreement after an investigation, its impact on
the firms’ profits and on the social welfare is only partial. We denote by θ, with 0 < θ < 1,
the share of the outcome (additional profits and impact on welfare) that has already been
realized.
Audits are assumed to be costly and the CA’s resources are supposed to be scarce
so that only a maximum proportion β < 1 of all potential agreements can actually be
audited. When the CA analyzes a case, it discovers with certainty whether an agreement
has been signed or not and receives a signal (σ ∈ {b, g}) , which allows it to revise its
beliefs about the impact of the agreement. This signal is imperfectly correlated with the
agreement’s actual type and the signal’s accuracy, denoted by ρ, with 1
2
< ρ < 1, is
assumed to be independent of the agreement’s type:
Pr(σ = b | T = B) = Pr(σ = g | T = G) = ρ.
6Reinganum and Wilde (1985a, 1986) in the context of tax evasion and Picard (1996) in the context
of insurance fraud show that the equilibrium audit policies are strongly affected when commitment is
impossible.
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Therefore, the risk of type I (rejecting a good agreement) and type II (accepting a bad
agreement) errors, occurs with the same probability: 1 − ρ. When the signal is weakly
accurate (ρ close to 1
2
), the CA will then take a decision based mostly on its prior beliefs,
while if the signal is very accurate (ρ close to 1) this decision will be based on an almost
perfect knowledge and errors are then unlikely to occur.
Finally, we assume that the fines that can be imposed by the CA are capped and
denote by F the maximum possible fine. In the European Union for instance, fines are
limited to 10% of the annual turnover of the involved firms.
Let us now show that a black list regime can be effective if F is high enough. Suppose
that the CA sets a probability of audit equal to β, decides to prohibit any agreement,
irrespective of the signal received, and sets a fine equal to F. The expected profit generated
by a bad agreement is then:
EΠB = 1− β (1− θ)− βF.
Therefore, if F is high enough, bad agreements (and thus good agreements as well) are
deterred. Note that because we have modeled the audit cost as a sunk cost, this remains
an equilibrium even when the CA cannot commit to a specific policy. In the rest of the
paper we will assume that:
F >
1− β (1− θ)
β
,
so that the black list regime is effective in the sense that there always exists an equilibrium
for which no agreement is signed and the expected welfare is WBL = 0.7
Let us now analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the ex post control game. As
usual in this type of situation, multiple equilibria might co-exist. We focus on the CA’s
preferred equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium generating the highest expected welfare and
only look for equilibria that yield an outcome differing from both block exemptions and
black list.8 Ajouter Référence (pour le choix de l’équilibre).
Consider first the optimal decisions that should be taken by the CA given the firms’
equilibrium decisions (s∗B, s
∗
G) 6= (0, 0) . If, when auditing, the signal received is bad
7Note that if the cost of auditing was not sunk, for any ε > 0, we could have an equilibrium for which
the expected welfare is −ε. This would be the case for
s∗G = 0, s
∗
B =
ε
1− β (1− θ) , p
∗ = β and F ∗ (b) = F ∗ (g) =
1− β (1− θ)
β
.
8Note that block exemptions only make sense for agreements with positive expect welfare (ω ≥ 1) ,while
black list is relevant for agreements with negative expected welfare (ω ≤ 1) .
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(σ = b), the CA updates its beliefs:
Pr (B | b) ≡ Pr (T = B | σ = b) = ρs
∗
B
ρs∗B + (1− ρ) s∗G
,
and therefore prohibits the agreements (δ∗E (b) = 0, possibly combined with a fine F (b))
whenever the expected welfare is negative, i.e. when:
Pr (G | b)WG − Pr (B | b)WB ≤ 0 ⇔ Pr (B | b) ≥ Pr (G | b)ω
⇔ s∗B ≥
(1− ρ)ω
ρ
s∗G.
Similarly, the CA prohibits an agreement for which it has received a good signal
(σ = g) whenever:
Pr (G | g)WG − Pr (B | g)WB ≤ 0 ⇔ s∗B ≥
ρω
1− ρs
∗
G.
Given that ρ > 1
2
, it is impossible to have δ∗E (g) = 0 and δ
∗
E (b) = 1 and therefore only
three combinations of decisions are possible. The following lemma shows that only one
case is relevant for our analysis.
Lemma 1 For the outcome of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the ex post control game
to be preferred to the block exemptions and black list regimes, it must be the case that the
CA prohibits an agreement if and only if it has received a bad signal, that is, δ∗E (g) = 1
and δ∗E (b) = 0 .
Proof. Consider first an equilibrium for which the CA clears any agreement whatever
the signal received during the audit. This would be anticipated by the firms and all
agreements would then be signed. Therefore such an equilibrium is outcome-equivalent
to the block exemptions.
Consider now an equilibrium for which the CA investigates with probability p and
prohibits any agreement whatever the signal received. In this case the expected welfare
is:
W = (1− p (1− θ)) (ωsG − sB) .
But for such an equilibrium to exist it must be the case that: sB ≥ ρω1−ρsG > ωsG, and
therefore W < 0. Such an equilibrium would thus be strictly dominated by the black list
equilibrium.
We now focus on equilibria for which an agreement is prohibited if (and only if) it is
investigated and the signal is bad. This is optimal when:
(1− ρ)ω
ρ
≤ s
∗
B
s∗G
≤ ρω
1− ρ .
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Note now that in this ex post control setting, the threat of having to pay an hefty fine
influences the firms’ decisions to sign an agreement. Optimally, the CA would like to deter
the bad agreements while ensuring that all good agreements are signed. However, since
it cannot credibly commit to a particular audit and decisions’ policy, such separating
equilibria cannot exist. At best, the CA might be able to ensure that all beneficial
agreements are signed while deterring some of the bad ones. Besides, this will only be
possible if the signal received during the audit is accurate enough, since the extra profit
generated by a bad agreement is larger than the profit created by a good agreement. The
firms’ expected profits when they sign are:
EΠB = 1− pρ (1− θ)− pρF (b) and EΠG = (1− p (1− ρ) (1− θ))π − p (1− ρ)F (b) .
For bad agreements to be partially deterred while good agreements are signed, it must
be the case that EΠB = 0 and EΠG ≥ 0 , that is:
F (b) =
1− pρ (1− θ)
pρ
≤ (1− p (1− ρ) (1− θ))π
p (1− ρ) .
This requires to have:
1− ρ (1 + π) ≤ p(1− θ)ρ(1− ρ)(1− π). (1)
Condition (1) is fulfilled for sufficiently high values of ρ ≥ bρ(p, θ,π), where bρ(p, θ,π)
is the unique value of ρ within the interval
¤
1
2
; 1
£
such that the left-hand and right-hand
terms in equation (1) are equal. Note that the condition (1) and the required level of fine
are independent of s∗B. Given that the expected welfare is a strictly decreasing function
of s∗B, the “semi-separating” equilibrium that will be preferred by the CA is such that
s∗B =
(1−ρ)ω
ρ and this is feasible (i.e. s
∗
B is lower than 1) whenever ω <
ρ
1−ρ . In this case,
the expected welfare writes:
WESS = (1− p (1− ρ) (1− θ))ω − (1− pρ (1− θ))
(1− ρ)ω
ρ
=
2ρ− 1
ρ
ω.
Note that this is independent of p. However, because both the fine and bρ(p, θ,π) are
decreasing functions of p this equilibrium is most likely to exist when p∗ = β . This is
possible only if F is large enough:
F ≥ 1− βρ (1− θ)
βρ
⇔ ρ ≥ ρ
¡
F, β, θ
¢
≡ 1
β
¡
F + 1− θ
¢ . (2)
If one of the two conditions (1) or (2) is not satisfied, that is, if
ρ < ρE
¡
β, θ, F ,π
¢
≡ max
£bρ (β, θ,π) , ρ ¡β, θ, F¢¤ ,
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this semi-separating equilibrium does not exist. The only other possible equilibrium that
generates a different outcome from both block exemptions and black list is then a “pooling”
equilibrium for which all agreements are signed. In this case, the probability of audit is
equal to β and the penalty has to be low enough (e.g. equal to 0). This equilibrium exists
if and only if:
(1− ρ)ω
ρ
≤ 1 ≤ ρω
1− ρ ⇔
(1− ρ)
ρ
≤ ω ≤ ρ
1− ρ .
In this case the expected welfare is:
WEP = (1− β (1− ρ) (1− θ))ω − (1− βρ (1− θ))
= ω − 1 + β (1− θ) (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) .
Finally, we have:
WEP > 0⇔ ω > ωEP (ρ, β, θ) ≡
1− βρ (1− θ)
1− β (1− ρ) (1− θ) .
The results of this analysis are summarized in the following proposition and illustrated
in Figure 1:
Proposition 1 The perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the pure ex post game that is preferred
by the CA, dominates the block exemptions regime if and only if ω < ρ
1−ρ . In this case,
we have:
• If ρ ≥ ρE ¡β, θ, F ,π¢ , the preferred equilibrium is the best semi-separating equilib-
rium (ESS) for which the expected welfare is equal to WESS =
2ρ−1
ρ ω .
• If ρ < ρE ¡β, θ, F ,π¢ and ω > ωEP (ρ,β, θ) , the preferred equilibrium is the “pooling”
equilibrium (EP ) in which all agreements are signed. The expected welfare is then:
WEP = ω − 1 + β (1− θ) (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) .
• If ρ < ρE ¡β, θ, F ,π¢ and ω ≤ ωEP (ρ,β, θ) , then the black list regime is preferred
and the expected welfare is WBL = 0 .
When the signal is sufficiently accurate, it is possible to deter some of the bad agree-
ments while ensuring that all good ones are signed. Moreover, for the best of these equi-
libria the proportion of bad agreements which are signed is low enough
³
s∗B =
(1−ρ)ω
ρ < 1
´
so that the expected welfare is strictly positive. Thus, the semi-separating equilibrium
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Figure 1: Optimal Ex Post Control
always dominates the black list regime. However, type I errors (i.e. prohibiting good
agreements) occur and the cost of these errors increases with ω. When priors are very
optimistic
³
ω ≥ ρ
1−ρ
´
, type I errors are too costly relatively to type II errors (i.e. allow-
ing bad agreements) and the block exemptions regime is preferred. Notice however, that
when the signal becomes more accurate, errors become less likely and the semi-separating
equilibrium is more often preferred.
When the signal is not accurate enough, it is no longer possible to obtain a semi-
separating equilibrium. The choice is now between the two per se regimes and a pooling
equilibrium in which all agreements are signed but some type I and II errors will be made.
We thus have an arbitrage between type I and type II errors: in the black list (resp. block
exemptions) regime the CA will only make type I (resp. type II) errors, while in the
pooling equilibrium type I as well as type II errors occur with the same probability: 1−ρ.
When ω is low type I errors are not costly but type II errors are. The opposite is true
when ω is high. Therefore, black list is preferred for pessimistic priors in order to limit
type II errors, block exemptions is chosen when priors are optimistic to eliminate costly
type I errors, while the pooling equilibrium will be optimal for intermediate values of ω.
Note also that ρE
¡
1, θ, F ,π
¢
> 1
2
. Even if the CA was able to monitor all potential
agreements, a semi-separating equilibrium would not always exist: the problem comes
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from the risk of error not from the fact that some agreements are not monitored.
4 Mixed Regime with Notifications
One of the problems when controlling agreements ex post is that part of the impact on the
welfare has already been realized. It would be preferable to be able to stop bad agreements
earlier in order to avoid the negative impact on welfare. One possibility is to require that
firms notify their agreement in order to obtain negative clearance before implementing it.
However, this ex ante monitoring can only work if the CA is also able to intervene ex post
in order to control (and if necessary prohibit and punish) agreements that would have
been signed but not notified. We now look at such a mixed regime of monitoring that
uses both notifications and ex post control and analyze the following extension of the ex
post control game:
1. Pairs of firms observe the type (T ∈ {B,G}) of agreements that they have the
opportunity to sign. They then decide whether to notify the agreement (nT = 1),
to sign it without notifying (sT = 1) or to reject it (rT = 1) . The CA only observes
the mass (“number”) of agreements that have been notified.
2. The CA decides how to allocate its budget between ex ante and ex post control: it
chooses which proportion of the potential agreements to control ex ante (a) or ex
post (e, with a+ e ≤ β) .
(a) Ex ante control: When an agreement is investigated, the CA receives an
imperfect signal (σN ∈ {b, g}) . It must then decide whether to allow the agree-
ment or not (δN (σN) ∈ {0, 1}) . It also has to decide whether to allow agree-
ments that have not been audited (δN (∅) ∈ {0, 1}) . Agreements that are al-
lowed are then implemented while agreements that have been blocked are aban-
doned.
(b) Ex post control: This stage is similar to the second stage of the ex post con-
trol game, that is, the CA takes a decision based on the signal received during
the audit (δE (σE) ∈ {0, 1}) and, when relevant, chooses the fine (F (σE) ≥ 0) .
We assume that notifications differ from ex post control in three aspects:
• As already mentioned, monitoring takes place before the firms actually sign their
agreements and therefore if the CA decides to block an agreement the impact on
the firms’ profit and welfare is null.
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• In order to be consistent with the European Commission’s practice, we assume that
no fine can be imposed if a notified agreement is blocked. We believe it to be a rea-
sonable assumption since the agreements have not yet been signed or implemented.
Imposing fines could therefore be seen as taxing firms for the right to sign and
implement an agreement, which is far beyond the aim of competition policy.
• Finally, whereas in the ex post control, agreements that are not investigated are
cleared, we assume that at the notification stage, the CA can always block an
agreement without investigating. In practice, the Commission cannot forbid an
agreement without analyzing it (firms would otherwise be able to complain in front
of a Court), however it can always delay its decisions, so that the agreement is de
facto prohibited.9
The notification stage is identical to the ex post control in all other aspects. In
particular, we assume that the audit technology is the same (that is, ρN = ρE = ρ) and
the maximum proportion of potential agreements that can be audited is again equal to β.10
We appreciate that these conditions are unlikely to be satisfied in practice: for instance,
a notification is costly for the firm that has to provide the European Commission with
detailed information about the agreement and the relevant market, whereas an ex post
investigation requires a longer and more difficult information acquisition process for the
Commission. However, our objective is to analyze the trade-off between a preventive
policy (notification)and a repression regime with fines (legal exception). We thus choose
to limit the differences between the two regimes to what we see as the essential features
(timing and fines) in order to be able to distinguish the effects of each instrument and
keep the model as simple as possible.
4.1 Preliminary Results
Characterizing and comparing the outcome of all the equilibria of this game is cumbersome
and we thus limit ourselves to identifying the values of the parameters for which the use
of notifications is optimal (i.e. increases the expected welfare compared to the ex post
control framework).
9According to Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998), the average length of the notification
process depends on the type of decision but is always longer than a year: 13 months for a settlement, 20
months for a comfort letter, 34 months to be granted a formal exemption and 44 months for a formal
prohibition.
10This is equivalent to assuming that the costs of an audit ex ante and ex post are the same.
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Lemma 2 There is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium that strictly dominates the preferred
equilibrium of the pure ex post control game for which either no agreement is notified
(n∗B = n
∗
G = 0) or no agreement is signed (s
∗
B = s
∗
G = 0) .
Proof. Any equilibrium such that n∗B = n
∗
G = 0 is equivalent to one equilibrium of the
pure ex post control game. This implies the first part of the proof. Suppose now that there
exists an equilibrium for which s∗B = s
∗
G = 0. Because the expected profit of a firm that
notifies cannot be negative, it must be the case that all firms notify or that the expected
welfare of notifying is exactly 0. However, if this is the case, the outcome is equivalent
to black list. Finally, if all agreements are notified, either ω is such that agreements are
never blocked in which case the equilibrium is equivalent to the block exemptions, or the
CA allocates all of its budget to the treatment of the notifications and the probability of
ex post control is 0. However, one firm would then find it profitable to deviate and sign
without notifying, since this deviation would not be detected.
As a consequence, we only consider equilibria for which some agreements but not
all are notified, that is, we have 0 < n∗ < 1 , where n∗ = n
∗
B+n
∗
G
2
is the mass of notified
agreements. The CA’s optimal decision when monitoring takes place once agreements
have been signed are identical to what they were in the pure ex post control case, that is,
audited agreements are prohibited whenever:
• s∗B ≥ (1−ρ)ωρ s∗G, if the CA has received a bad signal (σE = b) ;
• s∗B ≥ ρω1−ρs∗G, if the CA has received a good signal (σE = g) .
The analysis of the optimal decisions for ex ante control is very similar. On the basis
of the signal it has received during the investigation, the CA updates its beliefs exactly
as in the ex post case and therefore it decides to block an agreement for which the signal
is:
• bad (δN (b) = 0) whenever n∗B ≥ (1−ρ)ωρ n∗G ;
• good (δN (g) = 0) whenever n∗B ≥ ρω1−ρn∗G .
When it does not investigate, it bases its decisions on its priors and therefore blocks
the agreement (δN (∅) = 0) whenever n∗B ≥ ωn∗G .
Combining all of this means that we potentially have 12 cases for the optimal decision
profile ∆∗, where:
∆∗ = (∆∗N ,∆
∗
E) , with ∆
∗
N = (δ
∗
N (g) , δ
∗
N (b) , δ
∗
N (∅)) and ∆∗E = (δ∗E (g) , δ∗E (b)) .
15
Some of them can however be ruled out: for instance, the outcome of any equilibrium for
which either ∆∗N = (1, 1, 1) or ∆∗E = (1, 1) is equivalent to the block exemptions regime.
We also rule out any equilibrium for which ∆∗N = (0, 0, 0) . In this case, firms are actually
indifferent between notifying their agreement or refusing to do it and we then assume that
firms prefer not to notify.11 Thus, any equilibrium for which ∆∗N = (0, 0, 0) corresponds
to an equilibrium of the pure ex post game. This means that we are left with equilibria
for which the expected profit of a firm that notifies is strictly positive. In equilibrium we
must thus have n∗T + s
∗
T = 1 for any T ∈ {B,G} .
We can therefore restrict our attention to the following four types of equilibria:12
N1 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 0) , (0, 0)) for ωn∗G ≤ n∗B ≤ ρω1−ρn∗G and s∗B ≥
ρω
1−ρs
∗
G .
N2 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 1) , (1, 0)) for
(1−ρ)ω
ρ n
∗
G ≤ n∗B ≤ ωn∗G and
(1−ρ)ω
ρ s
∗
G ≤ s∗B ≤ ρω1−ρs∗G .
N3 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 0) , (1, 0)) for ωn∗G ≤ n∗B ≤ ρω1−ρn∗G and
(1−ρ)ω
ρ s
∗
G ≤ s∗B ≤ ρω1−ρs∗G .
N4 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 1) , (0, 0)) for
(1−ρ)ω
ρ n
∗
G ≤ n∗B ≤ ωn∗G and s∗B ≥ ρω1−ρs∗G .
Note that none of these equilibria exist when the priors are too optimistic
³
ω ≥ ρ
1−ρ
´
.
In this case, block exemption remains the optimal outcome. The main reason is that
notifications cannot be used to reduce drastically the number of type I
errors. (A revoir???)
Let us now assume that ω < ρ
1−ρ and compare the type Ni equilibria to the semi-
separating equilibrium (ESS) of the ex post control game. A first major difference is that
it is no longer possible to (partially) deter bad agreements: they will now be either notified
or signed without notifying. Moreover, because the expected profit of a firm that notifies
is strictly positive, it must be the case that in equilibrium ex post control is now less
efficient (in the sense that the deterrence effect is lower) than in the pure ex post control
case. Therefore, type II errors are likely to occur more often than in the semi-separating
equilibrium ESS and type I errors will be more frequent.
11Without this assumption we could generate equilibria that dominate any equilibrium of the pure
ex post game. However, this would be very artificial since it would only come from the fact that some
firms notify their agreement although they anticipate that their agreement will be blocked without being
audited. Moreover, these equilibria would not be robust to the introduction of an (even) infinitesimal
cost of notification.
12A preliminary analysis of these different types of equilibria is provided in appendix A. It will be used
in the proofs of the results presented in the rest of the paper.
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Consider for instance the type N2 equilibrium for which the decisions are ex ante and
ex post identical to the decisions taken in the ESS equilibrium: because all the firms must
be indifferent between signing and notifying, in equilibrium, the fine must be F (b) = 0
and the audit probabilities must be such that pN = (1− θ) pE . This also implies that the
probability of audit ex post will now be larger than β and therefore both types of errors
will be more frequent.
A similar analysis holds for the other types and leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Whenever the “semi-separating” equilibrium (ESS), in which all the good
agreements and part of the bad agreements are signed, exists, it is preferred by the CA to
any equilibrium involving notifications.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Consider now the case of pessimistic priors (ω ≤ 1−ρρ ) and compare the types N1 and
N4 equilibria to the black list regime. In both types N1 and N4 equilibria the number
of type I errors will be reduced but this positive impact will remain limited since ω is
low. On the other hand, type II errors - which are now relatively more costly than type
I errors - occur since the CA (at least) clears the agreements for which it has received a
good signal when treating the notification. Moreover, because the expected profits of a
firm that notifies is strictly positive, the probability of ex post audit cannot be too large
thereby increasing substantially the number of type II errors. This is made even worse
when the CA decides to clear notified agreements that have not been audited (e.g. N4).
This analysis leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 When the priors are pessimistic, that is when ω ≤ 1−ρρ , the black list
equilibrium is preferred by the CA to any equilibrium involving notifications.
Proof. See Appendix C.
4.2 When Is the Use of Notifications Optimal?
In this subsection, following the results of proposition 2 and 3, we restrict our attention to
intermediate priors,
³
1−ρ
ρ < ω <
ρ
1−ρ
´
and look for equilibria involving notifications that
are preferred by the CA to the pooling equilibrium (EP ) of the pure ex post control game.
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In order to better understand the type of equilibria that are likely to meet this criterion,
suppose first that the CA can ensure that all agreements are notified. The CA’s equi-
librium strategy is then extremely simple: notifications are investigated with probability
pN = β and the CA follows the signal received during the investigation, i.e., agreements
are blocked if and only if the signal is bad. Finally, it follows its priors for agreements
that are not investigated. The expected welfare is then equal to:(
WL = β (ρω − 1 + ρ) for 1−ρρ < ω ≤ 1,
WH = ω − 1 + β (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) for 1 < ω < ρ1−ρ .
Now remember that in the pooling equilibrium (EP ) , the expected welfare is
WEP = ω − 1 + β (1− θ) (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) .
Notice first that we have WH > WEP . This result is intuitive: The policies implemented
in these two equilibria are identical, but intervention occurs earlier in the notification
regime, i.e., before the agreements are partially implemented. The situation is even more
favorable to notifications when the priors are pessimistic (ω < 1): not only it is better
to intervene early but, given that the priors are rather pessimistic, it is better to block
agreements that are not investigated. Because agreements can now be blocked without
auditing, these equilibria also dominate the black list regime.
Unfortunately, in the framework with endogenous notifications and without commit-
ment an equilibrium in which all agreements are notified never exists. However, as lemmas
3 and 4 show, it is sometimes possible to find equilibria that are very similar to the “ex-
ogenous notification equilibrium”:
Lemma 3 There exists a threshold ω1 (ρ, θ) ≡ min
h
1, 1−ρ+2(1−θ)ρ
i
such that for θ ≥ β (1− ρ) ,
ω < ω1 (ρ, θ) and ε > 0 small enough, there exists a type N1 equilibrium with n∗G = 1 and
n∗B = 1− 2ε that is preferred by the CA to the pooling and the black list equilibria of the
ex post control game.
Proof. See Appendix D.
If the CAwas able to commit to its audit and decision strategies, setting e = β − a = ε
and high enough fines (e.g. equal to F ) would ensure that all agreements would be noti-
fied and we could thus have an outcome identical to the case of “exogenous notifications.”
This is no longer the case without commitment but, as lemma 3 shows, it is still pos-
sible to ensure that almost all firms notify. Set for instance the “unconditional” fines
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(F (b) = F (g) = F ) such that the bad firms are indifferent between signing and notify-
ing, that is:
pN (1− ρ) = 1− (1− θ) pE − pEF ⇔ F = θ − β−ε1−ε (1− ρ) .
This is feasible whenever θ ≥ β (1− ρ) , i.e., as long as the penalty is non negative and
will also guarantee that good agreements are all notified. Given that priors are rather
pessimistic (ω ≤ 1), it is optimal for the CA to prohibit an agreement unless it has been
notified, audited and led to a good signal.
To be an equilibrium, we must show that the budget allocation is optimal: allocating
more resources to the ex post control would only reduce the expected welfare since pE
would not be affected but pN would decrease. Consider now a marginal reallocation
towards ex ante control (da = −de > 0) . This has several effects: firstly, it increases the
effectiveness of ex ante control, and the corresponding benefit is almost (ρω − 1 + ρ) da .
However, it also leads to a greater number of type II errors ex post: although it applies
to a small number of cases (ε), the change in the probability of audit is important
¡
da
ε
¢
.
Nevertheless, because monitoring takes place rather late, the marginal cost of increasing a
is lower when θ is large and is only equal to −2 (1− θ) da. Therefore, the proposed budget
allocation is indeed optimal whenever ω is small enough, hence defining the threshold
ω1 (ρ, θ) .
Lemma 4 There exists a threshold ω2 (ρ, θ) ∈
h
1, ρ
1−ρ
h
such that for any ω > ω2 (ρ, θ) ,
β < 1− θ and any ε > 0 small enough, there exists a type N2 equilibrium with n∗ = 1− ε
that is preferred by the CA to the pooling and the black list equilibria of the pure ex post
game.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Lemma 4 is the counterpart of lemma 3 for optimistic priors (i.e., ω ≥ 1), and shows
that it is sometimes possible to achieve an outcome (almost) equivalent to the outcome
of the exogenous notification equilibrium. Consider now a type N2 equilibrium for which
the audit probabilities are p∗N = (1− θ) p∗E ' β and the fine is F ∗ (b) = 0 . In this case,
all firms are indifferent between signing and notifying the agreement. Note that this is
possible only when β is small enough, i.e., β < 1− θ .
Once again, to be an equilibrium, the impact of any marginal reallocation of the
auditing budget must be equal to 0. Recalling that a type N2 equilibrium is such that an
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agreement is valid unless it has been audited and the audit revealed a bad signal, let us
rewrite the expected welfare as a function of a :
WN2 (a) = ω − 1 + (ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG)
a
n
− (1− θ) (ρsB − (1− ρ)ωsG)
β − a
1− n,
and therefore the equilibrium must necessarily be such that:¡
WN2
¢0
= 0⇔ ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG
n
=
(1− θ) (ρsB − (1− ρ)ωsG)
1− n . (3)
This condition states that the marginal benefit of making ex ante control more effective
must be equal to the marginal cost of making ex post control less effective and is true for
any type N2 equilibrium. This equation sets a condition that has to be satisfied by nB
and nG and is in general quite complex. Let us however look at extreme values of θ.
Consider first type N2 equilibria for which n∗ = 1− ε. Condition (3) then rewrites as:
(ρsB − (1− ρ)ωsG) (1− θn) = (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) (1− n) . (4)
This condition is violated when θ is close to 1. This is not surprising since the benefits
of auditing ex post are close to 0, and it is thus preferable to increase the probability of
audit ex ante as much as possible. Suppose now that θ = 0. In that case, equation (4)
boils down to sB = sG : the CA’s policy to prohibit the agreements only when the signal
received is bad is consistent for any priors. There thus exists a threshold θ2, such that
such an equilibrium leading to an outcome almost equal to WH , exists for any θ ≤ θ2.
Note finally that when ω = ρ
1−ρ , condition (4) is again sB = sG , whereas when ω = 1, it
writes as:
(2ρ (1− n)− sG) (1− θn) = (2ρ− 1) (1− n)⇔
sB
sG
' 1 + θ (2ρ− 1)
1− 2ρθ .
When θ is large, i.e. when the proportion of the impact of the implemented agreements on
welfare is important, this last condition requires to have sB
sG
very large (or even negative
which is clearly impossible) and this would not be consistent with the CA’s decision rule
which requires to have 1−ρρ ≤
sB
sG
≤ ρ
1−ρ . Therefore, θ2 is increasing in ω or alternatively
condition (3) is met when ω is large but is unlikely to be satisfied (unless θ is close to 0)
when ω is close to 1; this defines the threshold ω2 (ρ, θ) .
Consider now a type N2 equilibrium in which almost all agreements are signed without
being notified, i.e. n∗ = ε. Most of the analysis we just have done for n∗ = 1− ε remains
valid and condition (3) now writes as:
ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG
ρ− (1− ρ)ω =
(1− θ)n
1− n . (5)
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This condition is now satisfied even for θ = 1. Such an equilibrium is thus likely to exist
for any ω.Moreover, because some agreements are notified, this equilibrium is preferred to
the pooling equilibrium (EP ) : decisions are indeed the same, audit probabilities are almost
identical but some of the agreements are monitored earlier which is always preferable.
However, because it is very similar to the “pooling” equilibrium (EP ) it is dominated by
the black list equilibrium if ω is too small. This analysis leads to the following result:
Lemma 5 There exists a threshold eω2 (ρ,β, θ) ∈ i1−ρρ , 1h such that for any ω > eω2 (ρ,β, θ)
and any ε > 0 small enough, there exists a type N2 equilibrium with n∗ = ε that is pre-
ferred by the CA to the pooling equilibrium of the pure ex post game.
Proof. See Appendix E.
We have focused here on extreme values, searching only for equilibria for which either
almost all agreements are notified, or almost all agreements are signed but not notified.
For some values of the parameters of the model, numerous other equilibria exist: for
instance, for values of ω larger than 1 (but also for lower values when θ is not too large),
it is possible to show that there exists equilibria for any n∗ ∈ [0, β]. Often these equilibria
will also be preferred to the “pooling” (EP ) and the black list equilibria.
We can now combine these different results to understand when notifications are op-
timal. Lemmas 3 and 5 lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Assume that θ > β
2
. The CA’s preferred equilibrium involves notifica-
tions whenever ρ < ρE
¡
β, θ, F ,π
¢
and ωEP (ρ;β, θ) < ω <
ρ
1−ρ . Moreover, there exists a
threshold θ
N ¡
β, F ,π
¢
∈
¤
1
2
, 1
£
, such that for any θ < θ
N ¡
β, F ,π
¢
, the CA’s preferred
equilibrium involves notifications if and only if ρ < ρE
¡
β, θ, F ,π
¢
and ω ∈
i
1−ρ
ρ ,
ρ
1−ρ
h
.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Lemma 3 shows that an equilibrium for which almost all agreements are notified exists
whenever the impact of the implemented agreements is important, i.e., θ ≥ β (1− ρ) and
when the priors are pessimistic, i.e., ω < ω1 (ρ, θ) . For values of θ low enough, ω1 (ρ, θ) = 1
for any accuracy of the signal low enough, i.e., ρ < ρE
¡
β, θ, F ,π
¢
. Therefore, notifications
will always be optimal for intermediate priors: ω ∈
i
1−ρ
ρ , 1
i
when θ and ρ are low enough.
Moreover, lemma 5 shows that an equilibrium with notification exists and is preferred by
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the CA to any equilibrium of the pure ex post game whenever ω > eω2 (ρ, β, θ) . Given
that this threshold is always lower than 1, notifications are always optimal when ρ <
ρE
¡
β, θ, F ,π
¢
and ω ≥ 1. Combining these two results, we obtain that when θ is not too
large, notifications are optimal if the semi-separating equilibrium (ESS) does not exist
and ω ∈
i
1−ρ
ρ ,
ρ
1−ρ
h
. When θ is close to 1, it is impossible to guarantee that the lower
bound will remain 1−ρρ . Intuitively, we should obtain that the bound will tend to 1 as θ
tends to 1 : when θ is close to 1, ex post control is very ineffective. Therefore, unless it is
possible to audit all notifications with probability 1, the CA stops monitoring ex post and
concentrates resources on ex ante control. However, if the CA cannot commit to an audit
policy, bad agreements are rather signed than notified. In that case, black list is more
efficient than the notification regime. Auditing notifications with probability 1 is possible
only when a small number of agreements are notified, and therefore such an equilibrium
is similar to the pooling equilibrium (EP ) .
ω
1
1

1
2
Block Exemptions
Notifications
Ex Post 
“Semi-Separating”
Black 
List
E, ,F,
Figure 2: Optimal Audit Regime
Figure 2 summarizes the results of the different propositions. When the signal is
accurate enough, a favorable self-selection of the agreements occurs, i.e., some of the bad
agreements are not signed. Thus, this is necessarily better than anything possible under a
notification regime. The problem with notifications is that it offers a “new safe heaven” for
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firms: because the worst that can happen is to see the agreement being blocked (without
fines), it is always worth notifying rather than giving up the chance to implement the
agreement. On the other hand, when the signal is not accurate enough, notifications do
better than a pure ex post regime for intermediate values of the priors. In the ex post
regime, all agreements are signed: it is then preferable to intervene early and this is made
possible by the notification system.
5 Concluding Remarks and Discussion
We can now interpret our results in the light of the recent reform of European competition
policy. As we have shown, the notification regime only dominates when the risk of errors is
quite high. This is likely to be the case for a young authority with limited experience like
the European Commission was probably in 1962. When the signal’s accuracy increases,
our analysis suggests to move away from an authorization regime to an exception regime
with ex post control. It seems reasonable to assume that after 40 years of experience,
the European Commission has acquired this knowledge and that its quality of judgment
is now much higher. Note that alternative interpretations of our results are possible: a
change of regime could also be explained by affecting the parameters β or θ. This would
for instance be the case if the CA has become more efficient and now needs less resources
to analyse a particular case (keeping the quality of audit constant). The same analysis
would hold if we admit that having a better understanding of the markets, the EC is now
able to intervene earlier or faster when dealing with a case under the ex post regime.
This paper also allows to analyze the relevance of the two other polar systems. The
prior beliefs are then crucial in the decision to use one of these two systems. We show
that when the quality of the information collected during an audit (ex ante or ex post) is
getting better, the two systems become less useful. Because we have focused on a given
category of agreements (i.e., a given value of ω), we limit ourselves to using one regime
only. It would however be more realistic to assume that the CA faces different categories
of agreements (i.e., a distribution of values of ω) and has to decide how to treat each
category under its budget constraint. Although our model does not allow for that, we
can use our results to conjecture what is likely to happen. If the signal is very inaccurate¡
ρ < ρE
¡
1, θ, F ,π
¢¢
, the CA has to choose between three regimes: block exemptions, black
list and notifications. We should then expect the CA to partition the support of ω in
three intervals: agreements for which ω is very low (resp. very high) would be banned
(resp. legal) per se, whereas those with intermediate values of ω would be required to
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be notified. If on the other hand, the signal is very accurate
¡
ρ > ρE
¡
0, θ, F ,π
¢¢
, then
a semi-separating equilibrium is always sustainable in the ex post game: we should then
expect agreements for which priors are very good (high ω) to be considered legal per se,
while the other categories would be audited ex post. For intermediate values of ρ, the
situation is more complex and we could potentially have co-existence of the four regimes.
Finally, let us discuss some issues about the robustness of our results. One of the
possible criticism of our model would be that it is usually costly to enter into an agreement
and firms therefore incur a non-trivial sunk cost due to the time and resources that it
takes to negotiate and structure such an agreement. This would for example mean that
firms who only have the opportunity to enter a bad agreement would never do so if the
probability of being detected is close to 1. There are however several reasons why we
believe that this is not necessarily true: firstly, the same sunk costs would have to apply
in the setting with ex post monitoring, so that the legal exception regime would always be
able to induce a more favorable self-selection than the notification regime when the signal
is accurate enough. Finally, such sunk costs are likely to be relatively small compared to
the benefits that the firms would expect from the agreements so that our results would
remain valid.13 We believe that this type of argument still holds if we consider filing
fees in the notification system as it exists for merger control in the US. This would differ
slightly from a sunk cost as it would only be paid in the ex ante monitoring regime.14
However, to have any impact these filing fees would have to be substantial. In the U.S.,
firms have to pay fees that vary from $45,000 to $280,000 when they notify a merger if
the value of the assets under consideration is above $50 million: this means that filling
fees are relatively small (never more than 0.1% of these assets). The introduction of filing
fees should not change qualitatively our results.
There are also other instruments that the CA might be able to use to increase the
efficiency of the different regimes. One such possibility would be to affect the probability
of error by setting different standards of proof. To be able to take this into account in
our model, we would need to assume that the risk of making type I and II errors are not
directly related (in our model we have Pr (Err[II]) = 1 − ρ = Pr (Err[I])). If we had
different probabilities, say,
Pr(σ = b | T = B) = ρB and Pr(σ = g | T = G) = ρG,
13Introducing a sunk cost c means considering πG − c and πB − c instead of πG and πB respectively.
If this cost is small, our analysis remains unchanged.
14See for example Besanko and Spulber (1993) who examine the impact of such filing fees on the
optimal policy for the case of mergers.
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the condition (1) to have a semi-separating equilibrium would write as:
1− (ρG + πρB) ≤ β(1− θ)ρB(1− ρG)(1− π).
Therefore by affecting the two probabilities ρB and ρG, the CA could increase the chances
to make a semi-separating equilibrium sustainable. However, once again, when both ρB
are ρG are close to
1
2
, a semi-separating equilibrium does not exist in the pure ex post
control game and notifications will thus remain optimal (at least for intermediate values
of the priors ω).
Finally, another assumption we have made is that the ex post audit is completely
random. This might not be the case in practice since some if not most of the ex post
audits take place following complaints or revelations about specific markets of firms. This
means that we might have underestimated the efficiency of the ex post regime. If this was
actually the case, it would mean that pure ex post control if preferable for lower values
of ρ but also higher values of ω. However, since not all notifications are analyzed ex
ante, we could also believe that the choice of notified agreements that are audited is not
random and this would also increase the efficiency of the authorization regime. Overall, it
is difficult to know in which direction our results would be modified but once again they
would not be qualitatively changed.
• Comment on repeat offenders (Emons?)
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A Preliminary Analysis of the Type Ni (i = 1, ..., 4)
Equilibria
We restrict our attention to the following four types of equilibria:
N1 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 0) , (0, 0)) for ωn∗G ≤ n∗B ≤ ρω1−ρn∗G and s∗B ≥
ρω
1−ρs
∗
G .
N2 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 1) , (1, 0)) for
(1−ρ)ω
ρ n
∗
G ≤ n∗B ≤ ωn∗G and
(1−ρ)ω
ρ s
∗
G ≤ s∗B ≤ ρω1−ρs∗G .
N3 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 0) , (1, 0)) for ωn∗G ≤ n∗B ≤ ρω1−ρn∗G and
(1−ρ)ω
ρ s
∗
G ≤ s∗B ≤ ρω1−ρs∗G .
N4 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 1) , (0, 0)) for
(1−ρ)ω
ρ n
∗
G ≤ n∗B ≤ ωn∗G and s∗B ≥ ρω1−ρs∗G .
Figure 3 shows when these equilibria might exist.
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 ≤ 1− 1−    1 1 ≤  ≤ 1−
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Figure 3: Optimal Decision Profiles
A.1 Type N1 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 0) , (0, 0))
In this case, the expected welfare is:
WN1 = (ρpNnG + (1− (1− θ) pE) sG)ω
− ((1− ρ) pNnB + (1− (1− θ) pE) sB)
= (ρωnG − (1− ρ)nB) pN − (sB − ωsG) (1− (1− θ) pE) .
For such an equilibrium to exist, the fines F (b) and F (g) must be such that the “bad
firms” are indifferent between signing and notifying, while the “good firms” must (weakly)
28
prefer to notify: (
(1− ρ) pN = 1− (1− θ) pE − pE (ρF (b) + (1− ρ)F (g))
ρpNπ ≥ (1− (1− θ) pE)π − pE (ρF (g) + (1− ρ)F (b))
⇔
(
ρF (b) + (1− ρ)F (g) = 1−(1−θ)pE−(1−ρ)pN
pE
,
(1− ρ)F (b) + ρF (g) ≥ (1−(1−θ)pE−ρpN )π
pE
.
For these conditions to be satisfied with positive fines, it must therefore be the case that:
1− (1− θ) pE − (1− ρ) pN ≥ 0.
A.2 Type N2 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 1) , (1, 0))
In this case, the expected welfare writes as:
WN2 = ((1− (1− ρ) pN)nG + (1− (1− θ) (1− ρ) pE) sG)ω
− ((1− ρpN)nB + (1− (1− θ) ρpE) sB)
= ω − 1 + (ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG) (pN − (1− θ) pE) + (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) (1− θ) pE.
For such an equilibrium to exist, the fine imposed ex post must be such that both types
of firms are indifferent between signing and notifying, that is:(
1− ρpN = 1− (1− θ) ρpE − pEρF (b)
(1− (1− ρ) pN)π = (1− (1− θ) (1− ρ) pE)π − pE (1− ρ)F (b)
⇔ F (b) = pN − (1− θ) pE
pE
=
pN − (1− θ) pE
pE
π.
Given that π < 1, this imposes to have pN = (1− θ) pE ∈ ]0, 1− θ] and F (b) = 0. The
welfare thus simplifies to:
WN2 = ω − 1 + (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) (1− θ) pE.
A.3 Type N3 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 0) , (1, 0))
If such an equilibrium exists the expected welfare writes as:
WN3 = (ρpNnG + (1− (1− θ) (1− ρ) pE) sG)ω
− ((1− ρ) pNnB + (1− (1− θ) ρpE) sB)
= ωsG − sB + (ρωnG − (1− ρ)nB) pN + (ρsB − (1− ρ)ωsG) (1− θ) pE.
29
A.4 Type N4 : ∆∗ = ((1, 0, 1) , (0, 0))
In this case, the expected welfare is equal to:
WN4 = ((1− (1− ρ) pN)nG + (1− (1− θ) pE) sG)ω
− ((1− ρpN)nB + (1− (1− θ) pE) sB)
= ω − 1 + (ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG) pN + (sB − ωsG) (1− θ) pE.
For such an equilibrium to exist, the fines F (b) and F (g) must be such that the “bad
firms” are indifferent between signing and notifying, while the “good firms” must (weakly)
prefer to notify:(
1− ρpN = 1− (1− θ) pE − pE (ρF (b) + (1− ρ)F (g))
(1− (1− ρ) pN)π ≥ (1− (1− θ) pE)π − pE (ρF (g) + (1− ρ)F (b))
⇔
(
ρF (b) + (1− ρ)F (g) = ρpN−(1−θ)pE
pE
,
(1− ρ)F (b) + ρF (g) ≥ ((1−ρ)pN−(1−θ)pE)π
pE
.
(6)
Let us first show that there does not exist any equilibrium with nG < 1. Any such
equilibrium would require the two conditions in (6) to be satisfied at equality that is:
⎧
⎨
⎩
F (b) = eF (b) ≡ (ρ2−(1−ρ)2π)pN−(ρ−(1−ρ)π)(1−θ)pE
(2ρ−1)pE ,
F (g) = eF (g) ≡ −ρ(1−ρ)(1−π)pN+(1−(1+π)ρ)(1−θ)pE
(2ρ−1)pE .
In order to have eF (b) ≥ 0 and eF (g) ≥ 0, we would need to have:
ρ− (1− ρ)π
ρ2 − (1− ρ)2 π
≤ pN
(1− θ) pE
≤ 1− (1 + π) ρ
ρ (1− ρ) (1− π) ,
but
ρ− (1− ρ) π
ρ2 − (1− ρ)2 π
≤ 1− (1 + π) ρ
ρ (1− ρ) (1− π) ⇔ (2ρ− 1)
2 π ≤ 0,
which can never be satisfied. Therefore any equilibrium must be such that nG = 1, and
the expected welfare thus simplifies to:
WN4 = ω − 1 + (ρnB − (1− ρ)ω) pN + (1− nB) (1− θ) pE.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Let us now show that we have (whenever the corresponding equilibria exist),
WESS =
(2ρ− 1)ω
ρ
= ω − 1 + ρ− (1− ρ)ω
ρ
≥ max
i∈{1,2,3,4}
WNi .
For this, let us consider the four types of equilibria Ni in turn:
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• ESS vs. N1 :
WESS −WN1 =
(2ρ− 1)ω
ρ
− (ρωnG − (1− ρ)nB) pN + (sB − ωsG) (1− (1− θ) pE) .
Using the fact that pN ≤ 1, this rewrites:
WESS −WN1 ≥
(2ρ− 1)ω
ρ
− (ρωnG − (1− ρ)nB) + (sB − ωsG) (1− (1− θ) pE)
≥ ρ− (1− ρ)ω
ρ
− (ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG)− (sB − ωsG) (1− θ) pE.
Rewriting:
ρ− (1− ρ)ω
ρ
=
ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG
ρ
+
ρsB − (1− ρ)ωsG
ρ
,
and using the fact that because ρ > 1
2
we have:
(1− ρ)
ρ
< 1⇒ ρsB − (1− ρ)ωsG
ρ
> sB − ωsG,
yields:
WESS −WN1 >
(ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG) (1− ρ)
ρ
+ (sB − ωsG) (1− (1− θ) pE) ≥ 0.
• ESS vs. N2 :
WESS −WN2 =
(ρ− (1− ρ)ω) (1− ρ (1− θ) pE)
ρ
> 0.
• ESS vs. N3 :
WESS −WN3 = ω − 1 +
ρ− (1− ρ)ω
ρ
− ω (1− nG) + 1− nB − (ρωnG − (1− ρ)nB) pN
− (ρ (1− nB)− (1− ρ)ω (1− nG)) (1− θ) pE
=
(ρ− (1− ρ)ω) (1− ρ (1− θ) pE)
ρ
+ ωnG − nB − (ρωnG − (1− ρ)nB) pN
+(ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG) (1− θ) pE
=
(ρ− (1− ρ)ω) (1− ρ (1− θ) pE)
ρ
+ (ρωnG − (1− ρ)nB) (1− pN)
− (ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG) (1− (1− θ) pE) .
Using the fact that type N3 can only exist if ρωnG ≥ (1− ρ)nB , this rewrites as:
ρ
¡
WESS −WN3
¢
≥ (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) (1− ρ (1− θ) pE)−(ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG) ρ (1− (1− θ) pE) .
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Note now that when type N3 equilibrium exists, we have:
ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG ≤ ρ− (1− ρ)ω,
and combining it with:
ρ (1− (1− θ) pE) < 1− ρ (1− θ) pE,
we get that WESS −WN3 > 0 .
• ESS vs. N4 :
WESS −WN4 =
ρ− (1− ρ)ω
ρ
− (ρnB − (1− ρ)ω) pN − (1− nB) (1− θ) pE
=
(ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG) (1− ρpN)
ρ
+ (1− nB) (1− (1− θ) pE) ≥ 0.
C Proof of Proposition 3
For ω ≤ 1−ρρ , we only need to consider the type N1 and N4 equilibria. Let us take them
in turn and check that the expected welfare is never positive.
• Type N1 : rewrite the expected welfare WN1 as a function of sG and sB:
WN1 = (ρω (1− sG)− (1− ρ) (1− sB)) pN − (sB − ωsG) (1− (1− θ) pE)
= − (1− ρ− ρω) pN − (2ρ− 1)ωsGpN − (sB − ωsG) (1− (1− ρ) pN − (1− θ) pE) .
From the preliminary analysis (see Appendix A), we know that for such an equilib-
rium to exist, it must be the case that 1− (1− ρ) pN − (1− θ) pE ≥ 0 , and thus
WN1 ≤ 0 .
• Type N4 :
WN4 = ω − 1 + (ρnB − (1− ρ)ω) pN + (1− nB) (1− θ) pE
= (1− (1− ρ) pN)ω − (1− (1− θ) pE) + (ρpN − (1− θ) pE)nB.
From the preliminary analysis (see Appendix A), we know that for such an equilib-
rium to exist, it must be the case that ρpN − (1− θ) pE ≥ 0 . Therefore:
WN4 ≤ (1− (1− ρ) pN)ω − (1− ρpN)
≤ ω − 1 + (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) pN .
Given that pN ≤ 1, this yields:
WN4 ≤ − (1− ρ− ρω) ≤ 0.
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D Proof of Lemma 3
We consider here type N1 equilibria for which n∗G = 1 and n
∗
B = 1 − 2ε for ε > 0 small
enough and limit our attention to ω ∈
h
1−ρ
ρ , 1
i
. For such an equilibrium to exist, the
following conditions must be satisfied:
• The budget allocation ((a, e) ∈ ]0,β[2 with a+ e ≤ β) must maximize the expected
welfare:
WN1 = (ρω − (1− ρ) (1− 2ε)) pN − 2ε (1− (1− θ) pE) .
• Fines imposed ex post must be such that:(
ρF (b) + (1− ρ)F (g) = 1−(1−θ)pE−(1−ρ)pN
pE
,
(1− ρ)F (b) + ρF (g) ≥ (1−(1−θ)pE−ρpN )π
pE
.
(7)
Note that the expected welfare is a strictly increasing function of both pN and pE.
This implies that in equilibrium the budget must be exhausted, that is a = β − e. The
audit probabilities thus write as:
pN (e) =
β − e
1− ε = and pE (e) = min
h
1,
e
ε
i
.
The expected welfare function WN1 (e) is thus a continuous piecewise-linear function of e
and is decreasing on [ε,β] . For e ∈ [0, ε[ , we have:
dWN1
de
¯¯¯¯
e<ε
= −ρω − (1− ρ) (1− 2ε)
1− ε + 2 (1− θ)
=
2 (1− θ)− (ρω − (1− ρ))− 2 (2− θ − ρ) ε
1− ε .
For the expected welfare to be maximized for e 6= 0 it must be the case that:
dWN1
de
¯¯¯¯
e<ε
≥ 0⇔ ε ≤ 2 (1− θ)− (ρω − (1− ρ))
2 (2− θ − ρ) .
This requires to have:
2 (1− θ)− (ρω − (1− ρ)) > 0⇔ ω < 1− ρ+ 2 (1− θ)
ρ
.
It remains to determine the minimum fine that is necessary in order for the constraints
(7) to be satisfied with positive fines given that in equilibrium, pE = 1 and pN =
β−ε
1−ε . A
first condition is to have θ ≥ (1− ρ) pN .
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Denote by eF (b) and eF (g) the values that satisfy (7) at equality:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
eF (b) = (ρ− (1− ρ)π) θ − ρ (1− ρ) (1− π) pN
2ρ− 1 ,eF (g) = (ρπ − (1− ρ)) θ − ¡ρ2π − (1− ρ)2¢ pN
2ρ− 1 .
Therefore:
eF (g) ≤ eF (b) ⇔ (1− π) θ ≥ ¡ρ (1− ρ) (1− π)− ¡2ρ− 1− (1− π) ρ2¢¢ pN
⇔ (1− π) θ ≥ (1− (1 + π) ρ) pN .
If we have (1− π) θ > (1− (1 + π) ρ) pN , then the constraint on the fines writes as
F ≥ θ − (1− ρ) pN which is always satisfied. When (1− π) θ ≤ (1− (1 + π) ρ) pN , the
constraint writes as:
F ≥ bF ≡ (ρπ − (1− ρ)) θ − ¡ρ2π − (1− ρ)2¢ pN
2ρ− 1 .
Note now that: bF = θ + ¡(1− ρ)2 − ρ2π¢ pN − (1− π) ρθ
2ρ− 1 ,
and given that θ ≥ (1− ρ) pN , we have:
bF ≤ θ + ¡¡(1− ρ)2 − ρ2π¢− (1− π) ρ (1− ρ)¢ pN
2ρ− 1
≤ θ − (1− ρ (1− π)) pN < θ.
Defining by ω1 (ρ, θ) = min
h
1, 1−ρ+2(1−θ)ρ
i
, such an equilibrium exists whenever θ ≥ β (1− ρ)
and ω < ω1 (ρ, θ) . Moreover, we have:
lim
ε→0
WN1 = β (ρω − (1− ρ)) > max
£
0,WEP
¤
,
and therefore, for ε > 0 small enough, WN1 (ε) > max
£
0,WEP
¤
.
E Proof of Lemmas 4 and 5
For any type N2 equilibrium, the expected welfare:
WN2 = ω − 1 + (ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG) pN + (ρsB − (1− ρ)ωsG) (1− θ) pE
= ω − 1 + (ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG) (pN − (1− θ) pE) + (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) (1− θ) pE,
is non-decreasing in both pN and pE, and strictly increasing in at least one of them.
This implies that, in equilibrium, the available budget must be exhausted: e = β − a .
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Moreover, WN2 (a) is a continuous, piecewise-linear function. We now focus on equilibria
for which
¡
WN2
¢0
= 0 for any a ∈ ]n+ β − 1, n[ . This condition writes as:
(ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG)
µ
1
n
+
1− θ
1− n
¶
=
(ρ− (1− ρ)ω) (1− θ)
1− n
⇔ ρnB − (1− ρ)ωnG
ρ− (1− ρ)ω =
(1− θ)n
1− θn . (8)
Let us now rewrite the condition (8) using the change of notation y = nB−nG
2
:
ρ(y+n)−(1−ρ)ω(n−y)
ρ−(1−ρ)ω =
(1−θ)n
1−θn ⇔ y = G (n) ≡ −
ρ− (1− ρ)ω
ρ+ (1− ρ)ω
θn (1− n)
1− θn . (9)
Note that the function G (n) is negative, strictly convex in n and such that:
G (0) = G (1) = 0, G0 (0) = −ρ− (1− ρ)ω
ρ+ (1− ρ)ωθ and G
0 (1) =
ρ− (1− ρ)ω
ρ+ (1− ρ)ω
θ
1− θ .
Note now that a type N2 equilibrium that satisfies (8) exists if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied:
(C2−1) :
(1−ρ)ω
ρ n
∗
G ≤ n∗B ≤ ωn∗G and
(1−ρ)ω
ρ s
∗
G ≤ s∗B ≤ ρω1−ρs∗G .
(C2−2) : The expected welfare functionWN2 (a) is maximized for some a ∈ ]0,β[ such that
pN (a) = (1− θ) pE (a) .
E.1 Equilibria with n∗ = 1− ε (lemma 4)
Consider an equilibrium for which n∗ = 1 − ε, for some ε > 0 small enough and focus
on values of ω > 1. Let us first focus on condition (C2−2) . Given that n∗ = 1 − ε, the
functionWN2 (a) is strictly increasing on [0, β − ε] and constant over [β − ε,β] . Moreover
for a ∈ [β − ε,β] , we have:
β − ε
1− ε ≤ pN ≤
β
1− ε and 0 ≤ (1− θ) pE ≤ 1− θ,
therefore condition (C2−2) can be met for some ε close to 0 if 1− θ > β .Moreover, solving
the condition pN (a) = (1− θ) pE (a) for a we get:
a =
β (1− θ) (1− ε)
ε+ (1− θ) (1− ε) ⇒ pN =
β (1− θ)
ε+ (1− θ) (1− ε) = β −O (ε) .
Let us now rewrite the condition sB ≤ ρω1−ρsG using the variables n and y :
(1− ρ) (1− n− y) ≤ ρω (1− n+ y) ⇔ y ≥ −ρω − 1 + ρ
ρω + 1− ρ (1− n) .
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Because G (n) is convex, conditions (C2−1) boil down to:
G0 (1) <
ρω − 1 + ρ
ρω + 1− ρ ⇔ H (ρ,ω) > I (θ) , (10)
where:
H (ρ,ω) =
(ρω − (1− ρ)) (ρ+ (1− ρ)ω)
(ρω + 1− ρ) (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) and I (θ) =
θ
1− θ .
Now note thatH (ρ,ω) is increasing in ω, H (ρ, 1) = 1 and limω→ ρ
1−ρ
H (ρ,ω) = +∞ ,while
I (θ) is increasing in θ and such that I (0) = 0 and limθ→1 I (θ) = +∞ . Therefore, there
exists a threshold ω2 (ρ, θ) ∈
h
1, ρ
1−ρ
h
such that for any ω > ω2 (ρ, θ) , condition (10) is
satisfied. Moreover, we have that:
for any ρ,ω2 (ρ, θ) = 1 whenever θ ≤ I−1 (1) =
1
2
.
Finally, this means that for such a type N2 equilibrium the expected welfare writes as:
WN2 = ω − 1 + β (ρ− (1− ρ)ω)−O (ε) > max
£
0,WEP
¤
.
E.2 Equilibria with n∗ = ε (lemma 5)
Consider now an equilibrium for which n∗ = ε, for some ε > 0 small enough and focus first
on condition (C2−2) . Let us solve the condition pN (a) = (1− θ) pE (a) for a and check
that we have a ∈ [0, ε] :
a
ε
=
(1− θ) (β − a)
1− ε ⇔ a =
β (1− θ) ε
1− θε ∈ [0, ε] .
This shows that condition (C2−2) can always met and in equilibrium we have:
pN =
β (1− θ)
1− θε > β (1− θ) ,
and therefore:
WN2 = ω − 1 +
β (1− θ)
1− θε (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) > W
E
P .
Let us now rewrite the condition nB ≤ ωnG using the variables n and y :
n+ y ≤ ω (n− y) ⇔ y ≥ −1− ω
1 + ω
n.
Because G (n) is convex, conditions (C2−1) boil down to:
G0 (0) < −1− ω
1 + ω
⇔ J (ρ,ω) ≡ (1− ω) (ρ+ (1− ρ)ω)
(1 + ω) (ρ− (1− ρ)ω) < θ. (11)
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Note first that this condition is always satisfied if ω ≥ 1.We now focus on ω < 1. Remark
that J (ρ,ω) is decreasing in ρ and ω, and such that:
J (ρ, 1) = 0 and J
µ
ρ,
1− ρ
ρ
¶
= ρ2 + (1− ρ)2 ∈
¸
1
2
, 1
∙
.
Therefore, there exists a threshold eω (ρ, θ) ∈ h1−ρρ , 1h such that for any ω > eω (ρ, θ) ,
condition (11) is satisfied.
We finally need to ensure that an equilibrium of this type is preferred to the black list
equilibrium:
WN2 > 0 ⇔ ω >
1− θε− βρ (1− θ)
1− θε− β (1− ρ) (1− θ) .
Note now that:
lim
ε→0
µ
1− θε− βρ (1− θ)
1− θε− β (1− ρ) (1− θ)
¶
= ωEP (ρ,β, θ) .
Therefore, defining: eω2 (ρ,β, θ) = max £eω (ρ, θ) ,ωEP (ρ,β, θ)¤ ,
we get that a type N2 equilibrium exists and is preferred to both EP and black list
whenever ω > eω2 (ρ, β, θ) .
F Proof of Proposition 4
From propositions 2 and 3, we already know that the only possibility for the preferred
equilibrium to involve notifications is to have:
ρ <
¡
ρ < ρE
¡
β, θ, F ,π
¢¢
and
1− ρ
ρ
< ω <
ρ
1− ρ .
Lemmas 3 and 5 show that there exist equilibria that dominate both the black list and
the pooling equilibria of the ex post control game whenever:(
either ω > max
£eω (ρ, θ) ,ωEP (ρ,β, θ)¤ ,
or θ > β (1− ρ) and ω < ω1 (ρ, θ) .
Assuming that θ > β
2
, we have that θ > β (1− ρ) for any ρ. To conclude the proof of
the first part of the proposition, it remains to show that ω1 (ρ, θ) > eω (ρ, θ) . Note that
ω1 (ρ, θ) is a decreasing function of ρ such that:
ω1 (1, θ) = min [1, 2 (1− θ)] and ω1 (ρ, θ) >
1− ρ
ρ
.
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Moreover, because J (ρ,ω) is decreasing in both ρ and ω, eω (ρ, θ) is increasing in ρ when-
ever it differs from 1−ρρ . It is therefore enough to check that:
ω1 (1, θ) > eω (1, θ) ⇔ min [1, 2 (1− θ)] > 1− θ
1 + θ
,
condition which is necessarily met for any θ ∈ ]0, 1[ .
This in particular implies that for any 1−ρρ < ω <
ρ
1−ρ , there exists an equilibrium
involving notifications that is preferred to the pooling equilibrium of the ex post control
game. To ensure that one such equilibrium also dominates the black list equilibrium for
any 1−ρρ < ω <
ρ
1−ρ , we have to show that:
ωEP (ρ,β, θ) < ω1 (ρ, θ) . (12)
This is always true if ω1 (ρ, θ) = 1, and we thus focus on values of ρ for which ω1 (ρ, θ) < 1.
In this case, the condition (12) rewrites as:
1− βρ (1− θ)
1− β (1− ρ) (1− θ) <
1− ρ+ 2 (1− θ)
ρ
⇔ (2ρ− 1) (1− β (1− θ)) < 2 (1− θ) (1− β (1− ρ) (1− θ))
⇔ 2 (1− β (1− θ) (2− θ)) ρ < (3− 2θ) (1− β (1− θ)) . (13)
Note first that whenever, (2 + β) (1− θ) > 1, then (13) is satisfied for any ρ > 1
2
. Suppose
now that this is not the case (e.g. θ is too close to 1 and/or β too small). In this case,
(13) is satisfied whenever:
ρ < eρN (β, θ) ≡ (3− 2θ) (1− β (1− θ))
2 (1− β (1− θ) (2− θ)) .
Now compare eρN (β, θ) and ρE ¡β, θ, F ,π¢ . We can check that eρN (β, θ) is decreasing in
θ and such that eρN ¡β, 1
2
¢
≥ 1 , eρN (β, 1) = 1
2
. Moreover, ρE
¡
β, θ, F ,π
¢
is increasing in θ
and such that:
ρE
¡
β, 1, F ,π
¢
= min
∙
1
1 + π
,
1
βF
¸
< 1.
Therefore, there exists a threshold θ
N ¡
β, F ,π
¢
∈
¤
1
2
, 1
£
, such that:
ωEP (ρ,β, θ) < ω1 (ρ, θ) , for any θ < θ
N ¡
β, F ,π
¢
.
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